The New Resistance
Real History
There is an invisible power which secretly rules.
|
1947 to 1951, FRANCE
According to Alfred W. McCoy in The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia,
CIA arms, money, and disinformation enabled Corsican criminal syndicates
in Marseille to wrestle control of labor unions from the Communist Party.
The Corsicans gained political influence and control over the docks--ideal
conditions for cementing a long-term partnership with Mafia drug distributors,
which turned Marseille into the postwar heroin capital of the Western world.
Marseille's first heroin laboratories were opened in 1951, only months after
the Corsicans took over the waterfront.
Early 1950s, SOUTHEAST ASIA
The Nationalist Chinese army, organized by the CIA to wage war against Communist
China, became the opium barons of The Golden Triangle (parts of Burma, Thailand
and Laos), the world's largest source of opium and heroin. Air America,
the ClA's principal airline proprietary, flew the drugs all over Southeast
Asia. (See Christopher Robbins, Air America, 1985, chapter 9.)
1950s to early 1970s, INDOCHINA
During U.S. military involvement in Laos and other parts of Indochina, Air
America flew opium and heroin throughout the area. Many Gl's in Vietnam
became addicts. A laboratory built at CIA headquarters in northern Laos
was used to refine heroin. After a decade of American military intervention,
Southeast Asia had become the source of 70 percent of the world's illicit
opium and the major supplier of raw materials for America's booming heroin
market.
1973-80, AUSTRALIA
The Nugan Hand Bank of Sydney was a CIA bank in all but name. Among its
officers were a network of U.S. generals, admirals, and CIA men, including
former CIA Director William Colby, who was also one of its lawyers. With
branches in Saudi Arabia, Europe, Southeast Asia, South America, and the
U.S., Nugan Hand Bank financed drug trafficking, money laundering, and international
arms dealings. In 1980, amidst several mysterious deaths, the bank collapsed,
$50 million in debt. (See Jonathan Kwitny, "The Crimes of Patriots:
A True Tale of Dope, Dirty Money and the CIA," 1987.)
1970s and 1980s, PANAMA
For more than a decade, Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega was a highly
paid CIA asset and collaborator, despite knowledge by U.S. drug authorities
as early as 1971 that the general was heavily involved in drug trafficking
and money laundering. Noriega facilitated "guns-for-drugs" flights
for the contras, providing protection and pilots, as well as safe havens
for drug cartel officials and discreet banking facilities. U.S. officials,
including then-ClA Director William Webster and several DEA officers, sent
Noriega letters of praise for efforts to thwart drug trafficking (albeit
only against competitors of his Medellin Cartel patrons). The U.S. government
only turned against Noriega, invading Panama in December 1989 and kidnapping
the general, once they discovered he was providing intelligence and services
to the Cubans and Sandinistas. Ironically, drug trafficking through Panama
increased after the U.S. invasion. (John Dinges, "Our Man in Panama,"
Random House, 1991; National Security Archive Documentation Packet "The
Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations.")
1980s, CENTRAL AMERICA
The "San Jose Mercury News" series documents just one thread of
the interwoven operations linking the CIA, the Contras, and the cocaine
cartels. Obsessed with overthrowing the leftist Sandinista government in
Nicaragua, Reagan administration officials tolerated drug trafficking as
long as the traffickers gave support to the contras. In 1989, the Senate
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations (the
Kerry committee) concluded a three-year investigation by stating:
"There was substantial evidence of drug smuggling through the war zones
on the part of individual Contras, Contra suppliers, Contra pilots mercenaries
who worked with the Contras, and Contra supporters throughout the region
.... U.S. officials involved in Central America failed to address the drug
issue for fear of jeopardizing the war efforts against Nicaragua .... In
each case, one or another agency of the U.S. government had information
regarding the involvement either while it was occurring, or immediately
thereafter .... Senior U.S. policy makers were not immune to the idea that
drug money was a perfect solution to the Contras' funding problems."
--Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy, a Report of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International
Operations, 1989.
In Costa Rica, which served as the "Southern Front" for the contras
(Honduras being the Northern Front), there were several different ClA-contra
networks involved in drug trafficking. In addition to those servicing the
Meneses-Blandon operation, detailed by the Mercury News, and Noriega's operation,
there was CIA operative John Hull, whose farms along Costa Rica's border
with Nicaragua were the main staging area for the contras. Hull and other
ClA-connected contra supporters and pilots teamed up with George Morales,
a major Miami-based Colombian drug trafficker, who later admitted to giving
$3 million in cash and several planes to contra leaders. In 1989, after
the Costa Rica government indicted Hull for drug trafficking, a DEA-hired
plane clandestinely and illegally flew the CIA operative to Miami, via Haiti.
The U.S. repeatedly thwarted Costa Rican efforts to extradite Hull back
to Costa Rica to stand trial. Another Costa Rican-based drug ring involved
a group of Cuban Americans whom the CIA had hired as military trainers for
the contras. Many had long been involved with the CIA and drug trafficking
They used contra planes and a Costa Rican-based shrimp company, which laundered
money for the CIA to move cocaine to the U.S.
Costa Rica was not the only route. Guatemala, whose military intelligence
service--closely associated with the CIA--harbored many drug traffickers,
according to the DEA, was another way station along the cocaine highway.
Additionally, the Medellin Cartel's Miami accountant, Ramon Milian Rodriguez,
testified that he funneled nearly $10 million to Nicaraguan contras through
long-time CIA operative Felix Rodriguez, who was based at Ilopango Air Force
Base in El Salvador. The contras provided both protection and infrastructure
(planes, pilots, airstrips, warehouses, front companies, and banks) to these
ClA-linked drug networks. At least four transport companies under investigation
for drug trafficking received U.S. government contracts to carry non-lethal
supplies to the contras. Southern Air Transport, "formerly" ClA-owned
and later under Pentagon contract, was involved in the drug-running as well.
Cocaine-laden planes flew to Florida, Texas, Louisiana, and other locations,
including several military bases. Designated as 'Contra Craft,' these shipments
were not to be inspected. When some authority wasn't clued in and made an
arrest, powerful strings were pulled on behalf of dropping the case, acquittal,
reduced sentence, or deportation.
1980s to early 1990s, AFGHANISTAN
ClA-supported Mujahedeen rebels engaged heavily in drug trafficking while
fighting against the Soviet-supported government and its plans to reform
the very backward Afghan society. The Agency's principal client was Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar, one of the leading druglords and a leading heroin refiner. CIA-supplied
trucks and mules, which had carried arms into Afghanistan, were used to
transport opium to laboratories along the Afghan/Pakistan border. The output
provided up to one half of the heroin used annually in the United States
and three-quarters of that used in Western Europe. U.S. officials admitted
in 1990 that they had failed to investigate or take action against the drug
operation because of a desire not to offend their Pakistani and Afghan allies.
In 1993, an official of the DEA called Afghanistan the new Colombia of the
drug world.
Mid-1980s to early 199Os, HAITI
While working to keep key Haitian military and political leaders in power,
the CIA turned a blind eye to their clients' drug trafficking. In 1986,
the Agency added some more names to its payroll by creating a new Haitian
organization, the National Intelligence Service (SIN). SIN was purportedly
created to fight the cocaine trade, though SIN officers themselves engaged
in the trafficking, a trade aided and abetted by some of the Haitian military
and political leaders.
KILLING HOPE:
U.S Military and CIA Interventions
Since World War II
by William Blum
|